SCIENTIA SINICA Informationis, Volume 49 , Issue 11 : 1412-1427(2019) https://doi.org/10.1360/N112018-00303

An approach for developing a highly trustworthy crowd-sourced workforce

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  • ReceivedMay 31, 2019
  • AcceptedSep 11, 2019
  • PublishedNov 4, 2019


Funded by




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  • Figure 1

    Four types of crowd workers according to their capability and integrity

  • Figure 2

    Signaling game between a crowd worker and a requester

  • Figure 3

    The process of the proposed mechanism. The left part is the overview of all periods, and the right part is the details of interactions in each period

  • Figure 4

    (Color online) Requester's accumulative payoff over 50 periods

  • Figure 5

    (Color online) Individual contribution to requester's payoff in each period

  • Figure 6

    (Color online) Accumulative administration costs

  • Table 1   The composition workforce after 50 periods (averaged over 20 runs), report-sample-and-pay is excluded because it does not kick out any workers
    机制 总余额 高能力工人数 诚信工人数 理想工作者 成功转化工人数
    运行前 运行后 运行前 运行后 运行前 运行后
    Signal-no-tolerance 353.10 102.40 98.50 181.10 137.10 16.75 16.55 336.55
    Report-no-tolerance 17.60 99.65 17.55 183.15 3.30 17.55 3.30 14.30
    Our mechanism 393.15 102.40 102.10 180.40 137.10 18.65 18.60 374.55

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