SCIENTIA SINICA Informationis, Volume 46 , Issue 11 : 1569-1590(2016) https://doi.org/10.1360/N112016-00114

Public data evolution games on complex networks and data quality control

Wenqi LIU 1,2,*
More info
  • ReceivedJun 5, 2016
  • AcceptedAug 2, 2016
  • PublishedNov 9, 2016


Funded by





[1] Tu Z P. The Big Data Revolution. Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2012 [涂子沛. 大数据. 桂林: 广西师范大学出版社, 2012]. Google Scholar

[2] Liu W Q. Modeling data quality control system for Chinese public database and its empirical analysis. Sci Sin Inform, 2014, 44: 836-856 [刘文奇. 中国公共数据库数据质量控制模型体系及实证. 中国科学: 信息科学, 2014, 44: 836-856]. Google Scholar

[3] Ma H D, Song Y N, Yu S Y. The research of IoT architecture model and internetworking mechanism. Sci Sin Inform, 2013, 43: 1183-1197 [马华东, 宋宇宁, 于帅洋. 物联网体系结构模型与互连机理. 中国科学: 信息科学, 2013, 43: 1183-1197]. Google Scholar

[4] Smith J M, Price G R. The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 1973, 246: 15-18 CrossRef Google Scholar

[5] Nowak M A, May R. Evolutionary games and spatial. Nature, 1992, 359: 826-829 CrossRef Google Scholar

[6] Nowak M A. Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science, 2006, 314: 1560-1563 CrossRef Google Scholar

[7] Chen G R, Wang X F, Li X. Introduction to Complex Networks: Models, Structures and Dynamics. Beijing: Higher Education Press, 2015. Google Scholar

[8] Santos F C, Pacheco J M. Scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation. Phys Rev Lett, 2005, 95: 98-104. Google Scholar

[9] Apicella C L, Marlowe F W, Fowler J H, et al. Social networks and cooperation in hunter-gatherers. Nature, 2012, 481: 497-501 CrossRef Google Scholar

[10] Wang L, Cong R, Li K. Feedback mechanism in cooperation evolving. Sci Sin Inform, 2014, 44: 1495-1514 [王龙, 丛睿, 李昆. 合作演化中的反馈机制. 中国科学: 信息科学, 2014, 44: 1495-1514]. Google Scholar

[11] Clutton-Brock T H, Parker G A. Punishment in animal societies. Nature, 1995, 373: 209-216 CrossRef Google Scholar

[12] Ostrom E, Walker J, Gardner R. Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible. Am Polit Sci Rev, 1992, 86: 404-417 CrossRef Google Scholar

[13] Fehr E, Gachter S. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Am Econ Rev, 2000, 90: 980-994 CrossRef Google Scholar

[14] Fehr E, Gachter S. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 2002, 415: 137-140 CrossRef Google Scholar

[15] Masclet D, Noussair C, Tucker S, et al. Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. Am Econ Rev, 2003, 93: 366-380. Google Scholar

[16] G$\ddot{u}$rerk O, Irlenbusch B, Rockenbach B. The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science, 2006, 312: 108-111. Google Scholar

[17] Nowak M A, Sigmund K. Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations. Nature, 1992, 355: 250-253 CrossRef Google Scholar

[18] Milinski M, Semmann D, Krambeck H J. Reputation helps solve the ``tragedy of the commons". Nature, 2002, 415: 424-426 CrossRef Google Scholar

[19] Sigmund K, de Silva H, Traulsen A, et al. Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons. Nature, 2010, 466: 861-863 CrossRef Google Scholar

[20] Zhang B, Li C, de Silva H, et al. The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract. Exp Econ, 2014, 17: 285-303. Google Scholar

[21] Schoenmakers S, Hilbe C, Blasius B, et al. Sanctions as honest signals--the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions. J Theor Bio, 2014, 356: 36-46 CrossRef Google Scholar