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SCIENCE CHINA Information Sciences, Volume 64 , Issue 9 : 192101(2021) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11432-019-2707-6

TZ-Container: protecting container from untrusted OS with ARM TrustZone

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  • ReceivedJun 15, 2019
  • AcceptedNov 7, 2019
  • PublishedAug 19, 2021

Abstract


Acknowledgment

This work was supported in part by National Key Research Development Program (Grant No. 2016YFB- 1000104), National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61772335), and Program of Shanghai Academic Research Leader.


References

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  • Figure 1

    Layers of attacks. Previous researches usually focused on direct attacks and Iago attacks [16]. In this paper we target the MUMA attacksat the layer of container abstraction.

  • Figure 2

    (Color online) Sample code of multi-process synchronization attacks. The malicious OS ignores $P$() and $V$() operations of an IPC semaphore to violate the mutual exclusiveness of the two code snippets.

  • Figure 3

    Design overview of the TZ-Container Each container process is protected by an IEE in the normal world. Each IEE is maintained by an IEE-managerrunning in the secure world. The container shield defends against Iago attacks and MUMA attacks.

  • Figure 4

    The procedure of creating an IEE. The kernel is responsible for creating a process, including constructing the page table. The created page table must be registered in the IEE-manager. Before entering a new process, the IEE-managerchecks the page table and enforces the memory isolation.

  • Figure 5

    (a)The overhead of all integer (INT) applications in SPEC_CPU 2006 benchmark, lower the better; (b), (c) the throughput of Nginx and Memcached, the higher the better; The $x$-axesof (b) and (c) represent the number of processes/threads used by the application.

  • Figure 6

    (a) and (b) The throughput of Redis and SQLite3; (c) the throughput of Redis with different numbers of containers. The $x$-axisrepresents the number of processes/threads/containers used by the applications. The higher the better.

  • Table 1  

    Table 1Attack considerations$^{\rm~a)}$

    Direct attacksIago attacksMUMA attacks
    Memory/Context
    attacks
    Disk I/O
    attacks
    Multi-application
    synchronization
    attacks
    Inter-application
    communication
    attacks
    User access
    control
    attacks
    Attack apps HasHasHas
    Attack containers HasHasHasHasHasHas
    SICE [21] $\checkmark$
    Fides [22] $\checkmark$
    TrustICE [23] $\checkmark$
    Overshadow [12] $\checkmark$$\checkmark$
    SP$^{3}$ [14] $\checkmark$$\checkmark$
    Virtual Ghost [19] $\checkmark$$\checkmark$
    MiniBox [24] $\checkmark$$\checkmark$
    InkTag [17] $\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\bigcirc$
    Sego [18] $\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\bigcirc$
    SecureME [20] $\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\bigcirc$
    Haven [25] $\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\checkmark$
    SCONE [13] $\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\checkmark$
    Graphene-SGX [26] $\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\bigcirc$
    TrustShadow [27] $\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\checkmark$
    gVisor [28] $\checkmark$
    TZ-Container $\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\checkmark$$\checkmark$

    a

  • Table 2  

    Table 2Security properties for protecting a container

    Security properties to be enforced
    P-1.1: OS cannot access container process's memory.
    Memory & CPU context P-1.2: OS cannot tamper with container process's CPU context.
    P-1.3: OS can only enter the container process from fixed points.
    Disk I/OP-2.1: OS cannot break the confidentiality and integrity of container file.
    P-2.2: One container's file cannot be accessed by any other container.
    Defending against Iago attacks P-3.1: OS cannot arbitrarily return value for syscalls.
    Multi-application synchronizationP-4.1: OS cannot tamper with the functionality of semaphore.
    P-4.2: OS cannot arbitrarily inject signal to container process.
    P-4.3: OS cannot tamper with the functionality of flock/futex syscalls.
    Inter-application communication P-5.1: Enforce the integrity and confidentiality of the communication data
    User access controlP-6.1: The permission bit of file and IPC instance cannot be tampered with.
    P-6.2: The permission of each container process cannot be tampered with.
    P-6.3: Only the process with correct permission can access a file or an IPC instance.
    P-6.4: Only the process with correct permission can send a signal.
  • Table 3  

    Table 3Single operation overhead

    Test case Docker ($\mu$s) TZ-Container ($\mu$s)
    null syscall 0.21 1.85
    open/close 7.37 12.2
    mmap 252 404
    page fault 1.24 2.53
    fork+exit 1865 6712
    fork+exec 3334 8875
    ctxsw 2p/0k 8.82 14.1
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