SCIENCE CHINA Information Sciences, Volume 64 , Issue 9 : 199104(2021) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11432-018-9678-8

On-demand cut off the covert channel to mitigate meltdown

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  • ReceivedSep 13, 2018
  • AcceptedNov 28, 2018
  • PublishedMay 27, 2021


There is no abstract available for this article.


This work was supported by National ST Major Project of China (Grant No. 2016ZX01040101) and National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61602498, 61872444).


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