# New automatic tool for finding impossible differentials and zero-correlation linear approximations 

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[^0]Dear editor,
Impossible differential cryptanalysis and zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis are two powerful methods in the block cipher field. Herein, we present an automatic tool to find impossible differentials (IDs) and zero-correlation linear approximations (ZCLAs) for both ARX and S-box-based ciphers. Similar to the idea of using mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) models for differential cryptanalysis in [1], we first use linear inequalities to describe all the target cipher's components exactly. However, we are indifferent to the objective function and only interested in knowing whether a solution to the whole system of inequalities for given input and output differences (masks) is present. If not, these input and output differences can yield an ID (ZCLA), as expected. Herein, we describe the search process in detail for IDs, but the process for finding ZCLAs is similar.

First, we describe all the target cipher's components exactly using linear inequalities. Herein, we focus on describing the differential patterns for modular addition and omit the linear operation and S-box descriptions [1, 2]. Because we are not interested in the probabilities of each differential pattern for non-linear components, we rewrite the modular addition constraints in terms of eight linear inequalities, about $40 \%$ fewer than the number proposed by Fu et al. [2] to search differentials. Assume that there is a differential $(\alpha, \beta \rightarrow \gamma)$ on the modular addition operation. To determine whether this differential is possible, we have two step according to the Theorem 1 in [2].

Firstly, to satisfy the condition on the least significant bit, $\alpha_{0} \oplus \beta_{0} \oplus \gamma_{0}=0$, we use the following equality:

$$
\alpha_{0}+\beta_{0}+\gamma_{0}=2 d_{\oplus}
$$

where $d_{\oplus}$ is a dummy bit variable.
Secondly, for each $i \in[1, n-1]$, there are 56 possible patterns for ( $\alpha_{i}, \beta_{i}, \gamma_{i}, \alpha_{i+1}, \beta_{i+1}, \gamma_{i+1}$ ). Herein, we use the
following eight linear inequalities, whose solution set comprises exactly these 56 possible patterns.

$$
\begin{array}{r}
-\alpha_{i}-\beta_{i}-\gamma_{i}+\alpha_{i+1}+\beta_{i+1}+\gamma_{i+1} \geqslant-2, \\
\alpha_{i}+\beta_{i}+\gamma_{i}-\alpha_{i+1}-\beta_{i+1}-\gamma_{i+1} \geqslant-2, \\
\alpha_{i}+\beta_{i}+\gamma_{i}+\alpha_{i+1}+\beta_{i+1}-\gamma_{i+1} \geqslant 0, \\
\alpha_{i}+\beta_{i}+\gamma_{i}+\alpha_{i+1}-\beta_{i+1}+\gamma_{i+1} \geqslant 0, \\
\alpha_{i}+\beta_{i}+\gamma_{i}-\alpha_{i+1}+\beta_{i+1}+\gamma_{i+1} \geqslant 0, \\
-\alpha_{i}-\beta_{i}-\gamma_{i}+\alpha_{i+1}-\beta_{i+1}-\gamma_{i+1} \geqslant-4, \\
-\alpha_{i}-\beta_{i}-\gamma_{i}-\alpha_{i+1}+\beta_{i+1}-\gamma_{i+1} \geqslant-4, \\
-\alpha_{i}-\beta_{i}-\gamma_{i}-\alpha_{i+1}-\beta_{i+1}+\gamma_{i+1} \geqslant-4 .
\end{array}
$$

Thirdly, by representing the input and output differences of each target cipher operation using corresponding binary variables and constructing a suitable system of linear inequalities involving these variables, we can exactly describe all possible differential patterns for each operation. Taken together, the complete inequality system perfectly describes the target cipher's differential propagation process, and every solution is a differential characteristic. If the inequality system is infeasible for the given input and output differences, it indicates that the differential is impossible.

By traversing a special set of input/output differences using the MILP model, we can confirm whether there is an ID within the set for a certain reduced-round cipher. Notably, covering all possible input/output differences is difficult owing to the time complexity; thus, this special set must be carefully selected, and it always depends on the features of the given cipher. Without loss of generality, we denote such a set as $(\Delta \rightarrow \Gamma)$, where $\Delta$ and $\Gamma$ are the chosen sets of input and output differences, respectively. Algorithm 1 illustrates how the ID search process is implemented.

Using this new method, we cannot directly identify where the contradiction appears or even determine whether the in-

[^1]Table 1 Summary of results for the HIGHT, SHACAL-2, LEA, and LBlock ciphers

| Cipher | Type | Round | Reference |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Impossible differential | 16 | $[3]$ |
|  | Impossible differential | 17 | $[4]$ |
| HIGHT | Impossible differential | 17 | Ours |
|  | Zero-correlation linear approximation | 16 | $[5]$ |
|  | Zero-correlation linear approximation | 17 | $[4]$ |
|  | Zero-correlation linear approximation | 17 | Ours |
| SHACAL-2 | Zero-correlation linear approximation | 12 | $[6]$ |
|  | Impossible differential | 14 | 15 |
|  | Impossible differential | 7. | Ours |
|  | Zero-correlation linear approximation | $[8]$ |  |
|  | Zero-correlation linear approximation | 9 | 10 |
| LBlock | Zero-correlation linear approximation | 16 | Ours |

a) indicates that this is only a related-key impossible differential for some master key pairs with the given master key difference.

```
Algorithm 1 General impossible differential search process
    // Step 1: Construct the MILP model.
    Represent the input and output differences for each operation as binary variables.
    Link the binary variables by adding linear inequalities for each target cipher operation.
    // Step 2: Find all the impossible differentials within a given set of input and output differences.
    Determine the sets of input differences \(\Delta\) and output differences \(\Gamma\).
    for input difference \(\Delta x_{i} \in \Delta\) do
        for output difference \(\Delta y_{j} \in \Gamma\) do
            Add all constraints related to the current input and output differences to the MILP model.
            Attempt to solve the model.
            if solver found a solution then
                    // The current input and output differences represent a possible differential.
            Break;
            else
            // The current input and output differences yield an impossible differential.
            Store the current input and output differences.
            end if
        end for
    end for
```

feasible state is caused by a bug in the code. To deal with this issue, we propose a verification approach. Assume that there is an $R$-round ID for the target cipher. Clearly, if removing certain inequalities from the MILP model indicates that the infeasible model becomes feasible, the contradiction must be related to the variables present in those inequalities. Using this approach, we can find a contradiction between the $\left(\left\lceil\frac{R}{2}\right\rceil\right)$-th and $\left(\left\lceil\frac{R}{2}\right\rceil+1\right)$-th rounds by removing some linked inequalities between these two rounds.

Finally, we apply our new model to the HIGHT, SHACAL-2, LEA, and LBlock ciphers. The results are summarized in Table 1 [3-9]. Actually, this tool is useful in search of IDs and ZCLAs for most ARX ciphers and lightweight block ciphers, more details see Appendixes A and B. Additionally, it can be used in evaluating the security of stream cipher and hash functions as well. However, there are still two problems in this tool to be solved in the future. Firstly, the search for cipher with 8-bit S-box is slow because of lots of linear inequalities to describe such S-box. Secondly, searching all case of target rounds of a cipher is difficult due to the time complexity, how to shrink searching scope to find the longest trail in suitable time is another meanful problem, especially under related-key setting. In the future, we will focus on these problems and improve this tool.

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Supporting information Appendixes A and B. The supporting information is available online at info.scichina.com and link.springer.com. The supporting materials are published as submitted, without typesetting or editing. The responsibility for scientific accuracy and content remains entirely with the authors.

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